Abstract. Testing-based methodologies like fuzzing are able to analyze complex software which is not amenable to traditional formal approaches like veri cation, model checking, and abstract interpretation. Despite enormous success at exposing countless security vulnerabilities in many popular software projects, applications of testing-based approaches have mainly targeted checking traditional safety properties like memory safety. While unquestionably important, this class of properties does not precisely characterize other important security aspects such as information leakage, e.g., through side channels. In this work we extend testing-based software analysis methodologies to twosafety properties, which enables the precise discovery of information leaks in complex software. In particular, we present the ct-fuzz tool, which lends coverageguided greybox fuzzers the ability to detect two-safety property violations. Our approach is capable of exposing violations to any two-safety property expressed as equality between two program traces. Empirically, we demonstrate that ct-fuzz swiftly reveals timing leaks in popular cryptographic implementations.
Introduction
Security is a primary concern for software systems. Programming errors like out-ofbounds memory accesses and inexhaustive input validation are responsible for dangerous and costly incidents. Accordingly, many mechanisms exist for protecting systems against common vulnerabilities like memory-safety errors and input injection. Among the most e ective automated approaches is coverage-based greybox fuzzing [10, 9] popularized by the American Fuzzy Lop ( ) fuzzer [48] , which has uncovered copious critical vulnerabilities in the core software libraries underlying a vast swath of software systems. Its e cacy is largely due to broad applicability and direct feedback: employs a genetic input-generation algorithm using only lightweight instrumentationbased monitoring to determine concrete vulnerability-witnessing inputs. Importantly, it works without user interaction and even source code, and sidesteps the computational and methodological bottlenecks imposed by traditional program analysis techniques.
Fuzzers like a -fuzz [48] target traditional temporal safety properties [22] , i.e., properties concerning individual system executions. Important security aspects like secure information ow [30] are two-safety properties [37] , i.e., properties concerning pairs of executions, and cannot be precisely characterized as traditional safety properties [24] . Secure information ow is particularly insidious given the potential for side channels, through which adversaries may infer privileged information about the data accessed by a program, e.g., by correlating execution-time di erences with control-ow di erences. Side-channels are di cult for programmers to reason about since they are generally hardware-dependent. Furthermore, while compiler optimizations are obliged to respect traditional safety properties, they are not designed to respect two-safety properties, and can thus generate insecure machine code which otherwise would be secure without compiler optimizations.
In this work we extend fuzzing to two-safety properties. In particular, we present ct-fuzz, 3 which enables the precise discovery of timing-based information leaks while retaining the e cacy of a -fuzz [48] . Via self-composition [7] , we reduce testing twosafety properties to testing traditional safety properties by program transformation, e ectively enabling the application of any fuzzer. Our implementation tackles three basic challenges. First, the program under test must e ciently simulate execution-pairs of the original; to avoid overhead, each execution's address space is copy-on-write shared. Second, structured input-pairs must be derived from random fuzzer-provided input; leaks are only witnessed when inputs di er solely by secret content. Third, leakage-inducing actions must be monitored; leaks are witnessed when, e.g., control ow or memory-access traces diverge, given inputs di ering solely by secret content.
Our implementation focuses on timing leaks related to program control-ow and cache; the name ct-fuzz refers to the constant-time property, asserting that the control-ow and accessed memory locations of two executions di ering solely by secrets are identical. Besides constant-time, we also apply ct-fuzz to ner-grained cache models to validate secure yet non-constant-time programs which ensure identical cache timing despite potentially-divergent memory-access patterns, e.g., by preloading all accessed memory into the cache. While our implementation focuses on side-channel leakage related to timing, it is extensible to other forms of leakage, e.g., power or electro-magnetic radiation, by further extending the instrumentation mechanism to record other aspects of program behavior. In principle, ct-fuzz could be extended to expose violations to any two-safety property expressible as equality between two program traces.
In the remainder we describe several aspects of the ct-fuzz tool. Sections 2 and 3 cover foundations and implementation concerns in testing two-safety properties. Sections 4 and 5 cover ct-fuzz's software architecture and basic functionality. Sections 6 and 7 describe case studies and evaluation, demonstrating the e ective application of ct-fuzz to many cryptographic libraries. We survey related and potential future work in Sections 8 and 9.
Theoretical Foundations
In this section we characterize ct-fuzz's foundations, including secure information ow, its reduction to traditional safety properties, and coverage-guided greybox fuzzing.
Secure Information Flow
We consider an abstract notion of secure information ow [30] over pairs of executions. We say two executions e 1 and e 2 are f -equivalent with respect to some function f when f (e 1 ) = f (e 2 ). We model program secrets by a declassi cation function D mapping each execution e to its declassi ed content D(e), and say D-equivalent executions are comparable. 4 Intuitively, this equivalence relates executions whose input and output values di er solely by secret content, e.g., by the value of a secret key. Similarly, we model attacker capabilities by an observation function O mapping each execution e to its observable content O(e), and say two O-equivalent executions are indistinguishable. Intuitively, this equivalence relates executions which a given observer cannot di erentiate, e.g., because of negligible timing di erences. In practice, we distinguish timing variations by observing divergences in control-ow decisions and accessed memory locations.
De nition 1. A program is secure when every pair of comparable executions are indistinguishable, for given declassi cation and observation functions.
Reducing Security to Safety
Self-composition [7] is program transformation reducing secure information ow to traditional safety properties. Here we say a given program is safe when it cannot crash. This simple notion of safety can capture violations to any temporal safety property [22] given adequate program instrumentation. For instance, 's thread, address, and memory sanitizers signal crashes upon thread-and memory-safety violations, and uses of uninitialized memory, respectively [33, 32, 34] .
The self-composition is a program (Fig. 1) , which executes two copies of a given program in isolation, i.e., execution of each copy is independent of the other, which:
-halts execution when the copies' executions are incomparable, and -crashes when the copies' executions are both comparable and distinguishable.
Intuitively, safety of the self-composition implies security of the original program. Conversely, if the original is safe and secure, then the self-composition is also safe. Theorem 1. A safe program is secure iff its self-composition is safe [7] .
Coverage-Guided Greybox Fuzzing
Böhme et al. [10, 9] provide a conceptual overview of coverage-guided greybox fuzzing as implemented by a -fuzz [48] . For our purposes, a simplistic view (Fig. 2) su ces: fuzzers explore sequences of program executions to expose safety-property violations (manifested as crashes -see §2.2) by randomly mutating the inputs to previouslyexplored executions according to per-execution feedback. Intuitively, feedback allows the fuzzer to navigate alternate program paths, and in practice, captures basic-blocks transition counts. From the perspective of this work, the salient aspects of a -fuzz are its broad applicability and e ciency: it works without user interaction and source code, and avoids prohibitive process-creation overheads by sharing executions' address spaces in a copy-on-write fashion. These features enable the rapid exploration of program executions for arbitrarily-complex software.
Design and Implementation Concerns
Applying self-composition ( §2.2) to coverage-guided greybox fuzzers ( §2.3) poses three basic challenges: e ciently simulating execution pairs; deriving structured-input pairs from fuzzer-provided inputs (fuzz); and detecting leakage.
Simulating Execution Pairs
The self-composition approach ( §2.2) dictates that two identical copies of a program execute in isolation. In the context of testing, achieving isolation includes separating the address spaces of each simulated execution so that the side-e ects of one are invisible to the other. On the one hand, the existing approach of duplicating procedures and variables is e ective for symbolic analyses like ct-verif [1] . However, actually executing such duplicated programs on their target platforms can alter the originals' behavior signi cantly, e.g., due to platform-dependent behavior. On the other hand, executing copies in separate processes undermines the e cacy of fuzzers like a -fuzz [48] , which largely avoid the overhead of process creation.
Deriving Structured Inputs from Fuzz
According to secure information ow ( §2.1), leaks are only witnessed by comparable executions, i.e., whose declassi cations are identical. So on the one hand, testing incomparable executions is wasteful. On the other hand, coverage-guided greybox fuzzers ( §2.3) provide inputs (fuzz) by randomly mutating previously-explored inputs. A self-composition which fed fuzz directly to its simulated executions would generate comparable executions with very low likelihood. For instance, when input variable x is declassi ed in the program P (x, y), the likelihood of randomly generating the fuzz x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 with x 1 = x 2 for comparable P (x 1 , y 1 ) and P (x 2 , y 2 ) is extremely low for typical datatypes, e.g., 32-and 64-bit integers. It follows that exposing information leaks requires non-trivial transformations from fuzz to structured input pairs.
Detecting Leakage
According to secure information ow ( §2.1), leaks are witnessed by comparable yet distinguishable executions, i.e., whose declassi cations are identical, yet observations are distinct. Assuming a reliable mechanism for generating comparable executions ( §3.2), monitoring leakage amounts to establishing a notion of observation for a given leakage model, instrumenting the source program to record such observations, and signaling a program crash when observations di er.
Software Architecture
We implement self-composition by a lightweight program transformation [36] . We invoke it as part of a -fuzz's -based instrumentation [48] for convenience, before passing the instrumented program to a -fuzz. The choice of an -based implementation was made for familiarity and convenience, e.g., due to bitcode being typed; in principle, our approach could be implemented at the assembly level. Following the concerns outlined in Section 3, our transformation provides three basic capabilities: e ciently simulating execution pairs, deriving structured inputs-pairs from fuzz, and capturing leakage-relevant observations.
E cient Implementation of Self-Composition
To implement self-composition, ct-fuzz borrows the same basic trick that makes afuzz e cient: copy-on-write sharing of address spaces via process forks. Figure 3 sketches our implementation strategy. After initializing the data structures used to capture observations ( §4.3), constructing inputs from fuzz ( §4.2), and ensuring the preconditions of the program under test, ct-fuzz forks the running process twice. After each child executes the original program on its copy of input, the parent checks equality of the children's observation traces. Section 5.1 describes the speci cation of programs, including stating their declassi cations and preconditions.
Our fork-based self-composition avoids a potentially-complex address-space management entailed by the existing duplication approach (see §3.1). Forking the existing process creates children with identical address spaces, thus minimizing the potential for arti cial divergence. Furthermore, the cost of forking is low on modern operating systems due to copy-on-write optimization: the virtual-memory pages of child processes point to the same physical pages as their parents; pages themselves are only duplicated when either the parent or child dirties them with subsequent writes. While forking provides ample isolation for basic CPU-driven programs like cryptographic primitives, we do not ensure isolation with stateful IO, e.g., interacting with les and sockets; this is a common issue for testing-based approaches.
Our implementation of self-composition also assumes that library functions are deterministic: a sequence of invocations returns identical values in both forked children. Nondeterminism can undermine ct-fuzz's leakage tests, since divergence between execution pairs may be due to nondeterminism rather than dependence on secrets. This potential is especially apparent in memory allocation: malloc is generally free to return the address of any unallocated chunk of memory. ct-fuzz handles this common case by linking the Jemalloc allocator [17] , which ensures deterministic behavior. 
Deriving Inputs from Fuzz
To transform the randomly-mutated inputs (fuzz) into program inputs which are likely to generate comparable executions (see §3.2), ct-fuzz generates per-program input processors. These processors depend on the signatures of entry points, as well as declassi cation annotations on program arguments. Besides the program under test, ct-fuzz expects such signatures and annotations to be speci ed using the API described in Section 5. Given this speci cation, ct-fuzz constructs an input processor, which constructs program-input pairs by reading (from standard input) one fuzzed instance of each declassi ed argument, and two fuzzed instances of each secret argument. ctfuzz invokes both program copies with the same fuzz for declassi ed arguments, and possibly distinct fuzz for secret arguments. While this mechanism does not guarantee that the corresponding executions are ultimately comparable, since further declassication can occur upon execution, e.g., declassi cation of output values, it does avoid incomparability due to declassi ed inputs. 5 
Recording Observations and Reporting Leakage
To capture alternate leakage models ct-fuzz provides an extensible mechanism for recording observations. As our initial implementation targets control-ow and cachebased timing leaks, our program transformation inserts instrumentation before branch and memory-access instructions; more precisely, we insert calls to the monitor API of Figure 4 . The monitor receives branch-condition values and memory addresses, along with the source location of each instruction, and records observations in a shared memory region for access by parent process. When observations diverge, ctfuzz signals leakage by inducing a crash which will be reported by the fuzzer; our current implementation causes a segmentation fault by dereferencing address zero.
Our initial prototype provides two distinct implementations of the monitor API. The rst constant-time monitor collects traces of branch-condition values and memory addresses directly; executions are distinguishable if they di er on any of the branch-condition values or memory addresses. The second cache-model monitor records Boolean values indicating cache hits or misses in place of memory accesses, allowing for the precise analysis of non-constant-time programs which are nevertheless safe for a given cache architecture, e.g., cache-preloading implementations (see §6). Our prototype uses Sung et al. 's cache model [35] , though any could be used in its place.
To limit the size of the allocated shared-memory region and time for equalitychecking, we leverage a fast hash-function [13] to replace the storage of arbitrarilylong observation sequences with one xed-size hash value. For each observation o, the monitor updates its hash value m to f (o · m) for a given hash function f . We state the correctness of this optimization as follows, where a perfect hash function f is one in which f (x) = f (y) iff x = y. Theorem 2. Given a perfect hash function, two observation sequences are equal iff their lengths and corresponding monitors are equal.
Functionality and Capabilities
Our ct-fuzz tool is capable of reporting timing leaks in any code base that can be analyzed with a -fuzz's LLVM mode. In this section we demonstrate the use of ct-fuzz on the simple cryptographic function in Figure 5 .
Specifying Argument Preconditions, Declassi cations, and Defaults
Our current implementation of ct-fuzz requires a brief speci cation of the program under test. Speci cally, we require information about program arguments: preconditions, declassi cations, and default values. Similarly to ct-verif [1] , annotations in ct-fuzz are written directly in the source language (i.e., C/C++), and processed by our instrumentation at compile time. Speci cations are attached to entry points using the CT_FUZZ_SPEC and CT_FUZZ_SEED macros. The speci cation in Figure 5 declassies the len argument (msg is secret), requires that each byte of the msg bu er be an -encoded decimal digit, and provides a default bu er containing bytes '1'-'4'. To facilitate the fuzzing of dynamically-sized bu ers like msg, the speci cation also declares that msg is a bu er of length len at most 4 bytes; alternatively, constant-length bu ers can also be speci ed. Default values provide the initial values (seeds) from which fuzzers begin their mutation-based exploration. While their speci cation is not strictly required, since fuzzers can begin with initially-empty seeds, reasonable seeds can boost fuzzers' performance substantially. We provide macros for specifying default values, e.g., SEED_1D_ARR. Similarly, while preconditions are not strictly required for fuzzing, they allow us to isolate leakage-related crashes from safety-related crashes by assuming that the original program is safe, and thus does not crash, so long as the preconditions are met. The provided CT_FUZZ_ASSUME macro triggers exit unless its argument evaluates to true. This mechanism leverages the fuzzer's ability to recognize branches and automatically synthesize inputs which pass precondition checks.
Exposure and Diagnosis of Timing Leaks
ct-fuzz applies the self-composition described in §4 on programs with speci cations, generating a binary executable and initial seed for fuzzing. The invocation of ct-fuzz:
$ ct-fuzz --entry-point=encrypt encrypt.c -o encrypt generates the encrypt binary and seed 0x31 0x32 0x33 0x34 0x04 0x00 0x00 0x00, according to the speci cation of default argument values. After copying the generated seed to input-dir, a -fuzz can be invoked directly: 6 $ afl-fuzz -i input-dir -o output-dir encrypt which instantly reports crashes indicating timing leaks, according to the constanttime property. This is the expected result, since the memory locations accessed by the encrypt function depend on the secret contents of msg. Speci cally, secrets are used as o sets into the book bu er. In principle, such secret-dependent memory accesses can lead to cache-based timing variations, and ultimately the leakage of msg contents.
To facilitate diagnostics, ct-fuzz includes a mechanism for logging and comparing the observations of the comparable yet distinguishable execution pairs, tracing observations and the source-le locations at which they occur. For example, comparing the traces generated for the leak exposed above: we spot the divergence due to the dereference of the book bu er on Line 7, column 14.
Using Alternative Leakage Models
For some applications, the constant-time leakage model is too conservative. For example, since the book bu er in Fig 5 ts into a single cache line (assuming standard modern architectures), it would be unlikely that the secret contents of msg a ect timing, since every access to book after the rst will hit the cache, independently of msg. Alternate leakage models can be selected in ct-fuzz with the --memory-leakage ag; currently we support two options: address and cache. The latter implements Sung et al. 's model [35] with xed values for block size, set associativity, and replacement policy. Extension to parametric and alternative models is straightforward. Using the cache model, we do not discover any timing leaks in the example above.
Experience and Case Studies
We have applied ct-fuzz to several popular cryptographic implementations -see §7 for empirical results. To highlight an interesting example, we consider the AES encryption functions of the Botan library invoked in Figure 6 . For simplicity, we consider potential leakage of a secret 16-byte key argument, xing all other parameters.
Analysis of Constant-Time
Applying ct-fuzz immediately reveals a constant-time violation, witnessed by a pair of inputs di ering only by their rst byte: 0xaa versus 0x2a. Comparing their execution traces reveals leakage from the SE_word function shown in Figure 7 : the single-byte input di erence leads to di erent o sets into the SE table computed by get_byte(3,x). 
Precise Cache Modeling
Although Botan's AES implementation is not constant time, it is still considered secure against timing leaks due to its use of cache preloading countermeasures. Speci cally, every entry in its lookup tables, e.g., the SE table, is accessed before the secret-dependent lookup-table accesses performed during encryption or decryption to ensure that all subsequent secret-dependent accesses hit the cache. However, previous versions were found to be insecure by SC-Eliminator's static analyzer [44] due to missing applications of the countermeasure in the aes_key_schedule function. Applying ct-fuzz to the insecure version immediately reveals a timing leak even with the cache-model monitor. Interestingly, the inputs for the rst-reported leak are identical to those reported in the aforementioned constant-time violation; further analysis demonstrates the same source of leakage in Figure 7 : one execution's access of SE[get_byte (3,x) ] is a cache miss, while the other's is a hit. The divergence can be attributed to the fact that the addresses of the four memory accesses in Fig. 7 are proximate for one execution, while for the other execution, the address of the fourth memory access is distant to the previous three, making them belong to di erent cache lines. As expected, reapplying ct-fuzz to the secure version reveals no timing leaks.
Empirical Evaluation
We evaluate ct-fuzz's ability to uncover timing leaks in a range of cryptographic implementations summarized by Table 1 . We analyze multiple entry points from each with the constant-time and cache-model monitors described in Section 4. Besides the benchmarks used to evaluate SC-Eliminator [44] , we have collected several libraries from their sources. Tables 2 and 3 summarize our results. 8 For each entry point, we run a -fuzz 10 times with 10 second timeouts. In cases where a -fuzz reports crashes, we re-run a -fuzz 100 times with the same 10 second timeout, and report the mean and standard deviations until crash for: time (in seconds), number of explored executions, and number of program paths explored. Otherwise, we re-run a -fuzz 2 times with a 100 second time limit, and report the execution and path counts until timeout.
Analysis with the Constant-Time Monitor
ct-fuzz swiftly reports constant-time violations due to secret-dependent table lookups, e.g., all of Wu et al.'s benchmarks. OpenSSL's C implementation of AES encryption leverages substitution boxes. For supposedly constant-time implementations such as BearSSL's constant-time AES encryption (aes_ct) and libsodium's constant-time utility functions (sodium_increment, sodium_is_zero), ct-fuzz reports no violations. In our experience with these benchmarks, a -fuzz does not report any violations, even after several hours, that are not reported within a few seconds. On average, ct-fuzz uncovers violations within half of a second, exploring only hundreds of executions. Execution counts are approximate, since a -fuzz's AFL_BENCH_UNTIL_CRASH mode only guarantees termination soon after the rst crash. Furthermore, path counts report the number of unique non-crashing control-ow paths discovered by a -fuzz; paths are often unique since cryptographic implementations tend to use fairly straight-line code.
Analysis with the Cache-Model Monitor
We further run ct-fuzz with our cache-model monitor (see § 5.3). The cache model is identical to that used in the evaluation of SC-Eliminator [44] : a fully associative LRU Implementations taken from original sources BearSSL v0.5: an implementation of the SSL/TLS protocol (RFC 5246) written in C. https://bearssl.org libsodium @973cdb5: a modern, easy-to-use software library for encryption, decryption, signatures, password hashing and more. https://download.libsodium.org/doc OpenSSL v1.1.0h: a robust, commercial-grade, and full-featured toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols. https://www.openssl.org poly1305-donna @e6ad6e0: a state-of-the-art message-authentication code. https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna poly1305-opt @700d5cf: a portable, performant implementation of Poly1305. https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-opt s2n @745fdd8: a C99 implementation of the TLS/SSL protocols that is designed to be simple, small, fast, and with security as a priority. https://github.com/awslabs/s2n
Implementations sourced from Wu et al. [44] Applied Crypto: textbook implementations from Applied Cryptography: protocols, algorithms, and source code in C [31] .
ChronOS: Cryptographic primitives in ChronOS linux. http://www.chronoslinux.org cache of 512 64-byte lines. We report no timing leaks for Wu et al.'s FELICS benchmarks [44] according to the cache-model monitor, which is expected since their lookup tables are small enough to t into one cache line. This is consistent with SC-Eliminator's static analysis, although our notion of leakage, framed as a two-safety property, is a more-precise characterization which avoids the potential for false positives -see §8. Furthermore, we report no timing leaks for constant-time functions like aes_ct, which is expected since constant-time is stricter than the absence of leakage according to a precise cache model. The di erences in the number of executions explored until crash compared with the constant-time monitor is due to the approximation of execution counts: since the constant-time monitor is more e cient than the cache-model monitor, a -fuzz squeezes in many more executions between the rst crash and termination. [44] with ct-fuzz. We report averages with standard deviations until leak detection over 100 runs for: time (in seconds), executions, and paths.
Related Work
The literature around secure information ow is vast, and Sabelfeld and Myers o er a compelling survey [30] . Here we highlight recent works to detecting timing sidechannel leaks with program analysis. We distinguish between symbolic approaches, e.g., involving veri cation, model checking, and abstract interpretation, and concrete approaches, e.g., testing and coverage-guided greybox fuzzing, which observe executions on programs' target platforms. Along another axis, we di erentiate works according to how they identify leakage, whether it be tracking the ow of data through program values, statistical measures on the distributions of program executions, or as two-safety properties on pairs of program executions.
Symbolic Analyses
While our work accurately detects leakage, most related works soundly establish the absence of leaks. In contrast, our testing-based approach sacri ces soundness 9 for precision and e ciency, without introducing the potential for false positives or computational bottlenecks due to abstract symbolic reasoning. We identify several works based on symbolic analysis of data-ow or two-safety properties.
Flow Tracking Many recent works propose static analyses to prove secure information ow. tis-ct [39] extends Frama-C [14] with static analysis to compute program dependencies and infer potential leaks. VirtualCert [6] Table 3 . Analysis of open-source crypto implementations with ct-fuzz. Declassi ed inputs are listed in boldface. We report averages with standard deviations until leak detection over 100 runs for: time (in seconds), executions, and paths.
of tracking aliasing and information ow into the CompCert certi ed compiler [21] . FlowTracker [29] developed e cient static information-ow analyses based on the single static assignment ( ) representation rather than program dependence graphs ( ). Blazy et al. [8] developed context-sensitive and arithmetic-aware alias analyses to verify constant time of C programs using the Verasco static analyzer [18] . CacheAudit [16, 15] developed e ective cache-aware abstract domains to prove the absence of cache-based side channels using abstract interpretation. SC-Eliminator [44] performs static analysis to identify or prove the absence of potential cache-timing leaks, and synthesizes patches by replacing conditional statements and lookup-table accesses.
Other works employ satis ability-based techniques. CacheD [41] uses symbolic execution to identify potential cache-access variations as expressions over secrets. SCInfer [49] combines type-inference and satis ability modulo theories ( ) to verify random masking of program secrets.
[35] performs analysis-friendly program instrumentation enabling symbolic reasoning about cache-related properties, e.g., which accesses are cache hits.
[12] uses [19] to prove the absence of leaks, or synthesizes patches for discovered leaks.
Two-Safety Barthe et al. [7] originally proposed the self-composition program transformation to reduce the veri cation of two-safety properties like secure information ow to traditional safety veri cation. Terauchi and Aiken [37] re ned their approach with a type-directed transformation to apply self-composition selectively, with a simpler cross-product transformation [47] around low-security program fragments. Milushev et al. [25] adapt this approach for use with the symbolic execution engine [11] , while ENCoVer [5] leverages Java PathFinder [40] . Phan [26] reformulates self-composition as path equivalence for direct symbolic execution of the original program.
Almeida et al. [2] developed a self-composition based methodology for proving constant-time of C programs using Frama-C [14] . The recently developed ct-verif [1] and SideTrail [4] tools apply selective self-composition to verify constant-time and time-balancing, respectively, in C-language cryptographic primitives using the veri er [27] . Yang et al. [46] propose lazy self-composition to apply precise reasoning only as a fallback to coarser techniques like taint analysis. Blazer [3] proposes quotient partitioning as an alternative, compositional reduction to traditional safety veri cation.
Concrete Analyses
More closely aligned with our approach are those based on observing executions on programs' target platforms, thus avoiding the potential for false positives and computational bottlenecks due to abstract symbolic reasoning. While we consider secure information ow as a two-safety property, other works are based either on tracking data-ow or statistical analysis.
Flow Tracking The key work in this space is ctgrind [20] , which extends Valgrind [38] with a taint-tracking mechanism to track whether secrets ow into accessed memory locations. While this avoids the bottlenecks of symbolic reasoning, this approach is susceptible to false positives, since secret-tainted observations are falsely considered leaks when they depend also on public or declassi ed data values. Considering secure information ow as a two-safety property avoids this source of false positives.
Statistics A few approaches detect timing leaks using statistical methods. dudect [28] records the execution time of many (typically millions) of executions with inputs partitioned into random and xed values. While measuring execution time directly avoids the imprecision of indirect measurements like memory-access traces, this can also be considered a source of false negatives, since timing observed in a given test environment can vary signi cantly from other platforms and system loads.
Other statistical approaches measure traces of memory and control-ow operations.
[42] detects di erences among traces of executions with random inputs, before honing in on statistical tests with xed-versus random-secret inputs; the approach relies on expert interaction for classi cation of potential leaks, and is susceptible to false positives due to program nondeterminism, e.g., of memory allocators. MicroWalk [43] proposes alternative statistical tests based on mutual information analysis.
Two-Safety
To the best of our knowledge, [23] is the only other concreteanalysis approach considering secure information ow as a two-safety property. Like our work, compares observations along two executions in which the second receives the rst's inputs randomly mutated. However, since only program values are observed, cannot detect leakage due to side-channels like timing.
Conclusion and Future Work
This work demonstrates that testing-based software analysis methodologies can be e ectively extended from safety properties to two-safety properties. While our initial application has targeted timing leaks in cryptographic implementations, there are several promising directions for future investigation. Since cryptographic code tends to follow rather simple straight-line control ow, coverage-guided greybox fuzzers o er relatively little over more simplistic random testing; exposing leaks in more complex input-processing applications such as encoders and decoders [45] could better exploit two-safety-property fuzzers. Furthermore, ct-fuzz could be applied to other types of leakage, and even other classes of two-safety properties, by extending the instrumentation mechanism; in principle, our approach is capable of exposing violations to any two-safety property expressed as equality between program traces.
